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ABSTRACT 
Since its launch just over a decade ago by the cryptocurrency Bitcoin, the distributed ledger technology 
(DLT) blockchain has followed a breathtaking trajectory into manifold application spaces. This paper 
analyses how key factors underpinning the success of this ground-breaking “internet of value” technology, 
such as staking of collateral (“skin in the game”), competitive crowdsourcing, crowdfunding, and 
prediction markets, can be applied to substantially innovate the legacy organization of science, research and 
technology development (RTD). 
Here, we elaborate a highly integrative, community-based strategy where a token-based crypto-economy 
supports finding best possible consensus, trust and truth through adding unconventional elements known 
from reputation systems, betting, secondary markets and social networking. These tokens support the 
holder’s formalized reputation, and are used in liquid-democracy style governance and arbitration within 
projects or community-driven initiatives. This participatory research model serves as a solid basis for 
comprehensively leveraging collective intelligence by effectively incentivizing contributions from the 
crowd, such as intellectual property (IP), work, validation, assessment, infrastructure, education, 
assessment, governance, publication, and promotion of projects. On the analogy of its current blockbusters 
like peer-to-peer structured decentralized finance (“DeFi”), blockchain technology can seminally enhance 
the efficiency of science and RTD initiatives, even permitting to fully stage operations as a chiefless 
Decentralised Autonomous Organization (DAOs). 
INDEX TERMS 
blockchain, distributed ledger technology, science, research, token economy, cryptoeconomy, consensus, 
reputation systems, liquid democracy, participatory research, collective intelligence, wisdom of the crowd, 
decentralization
1 INTRODUCTION 
From a bigger perspective, science, research and technology development (RTD) pursue the overarching goal 
of generating beneficial knowledge that aims to contribute to the good of mankind. Basic science is driven by 




objectives, technology improves the quality of our lives, e.g., in terms of addressing fundamental needs in 
food, health and education, or providing convenience such as water, energy, transportation, automation, 
communication and entertainment. 
While, at least in the public eye, major breakthroughs are often linked to a single person, practically all 
historical achievements in science and RTD are deeply rooted in the foundational work of a community which 
produced the fundamental research as well as enabling methods, equipment, and infrastructure within a 
supporting culture and, last but not least, a pool of highly qualified and motivated talent stimulating 
productivity within a competitive environment. 
Generation of basic knowledge is presently, for the most part, sponsored by governmental organisations and 
foundations to address health, economic, scientific, societal, ethical, and environmental topics and issues, to 
boost prestige through high-impact publicity, or by businesses to gain a competitive edge for eventually 
enhancing their profits. Involvement of individuals in such initiatives may be motivated by a variety of 
objectives, ranging from career opportunity, reputation, social recognition, creativity, altruism and monetary 
rewards. 
Recent decades have seen a strong trend towards globalization that has been enabled by sophisticated 
networks of logistics and highly intertwined global supply chains which are meticulously coordinated by 
transnationally operating information and communication technology (ICT). With the wide-scale penetration 
of internet, ensued by the availability of cloud computing and artificial intelligence (AI), possibly accessed by 
science as a service models [1], and 5G networks for real-time applications, even in remote and economically 
disadvantaged locations, access to and creation of knowledge has already reached historically unprecedented 
levels. 
The recent past has also seen game-changing advances in ubiquitous / additive manufacturing (UM / AM), 
primarily by 3D printing [2], or open-source platforms, e.g., in software [3], electronics [4] and microsystems 
[5], virtualisation, for instance, through “digital twins” [6], open-access facilities for prototyping, 
characterization and application development [7-11] and data on demand [12]. The wide-scale availability of 
these novel resources will progressively empower individuals from the crowd, such as the “citizen scientist” 
[13, 14] or “garage entrepreneur”, to create, customize or sell many digital and physical goods from and to 
practically anywhere. In addition, the emergence of redistributed manufacture (RDM) echoes that production 
is becoming increasingly decentralised, e.g., even in the highly regulated pharmaceutical industry [15, 16] and 
aerospace [17]. 
Open science and community-based participatory research (CBPR) for socio-environmental issues is another 
area of focus [18]. Here, discovering and sharing goals that actors with different interests could tackle together 
(a ‘transcend’ method), in addition to ethical equity, fair access to data, and dialog, represent essential 
components. The constructive interplay of these strong trends set the path for a democratization of an 
inclusive science and RTD landscape where a wide range of actors, whether institutions or freelancers [19-
21], can decisively contribute and receive their fair share in value creation. 
CBPR has been regarded as the gold standard for equitable and partnered research in traditional communities 
[22]. In capturing the collaborative process between community-based organizations and academic 
investigators, CBPR models have demonstrated the potential to make research more responsive to existing 
needs, and to improve a community’s ability to address a range of common issues [23]. Such CBPR 
approaches can be enhanced by token systems  (“tokenisation”) which, on the one hand, crypto-economically 
incentivize efficient crowdsourcing of collective intelligence [24, 25], while, on the other hand, requesting 
cryptoassets as collateral (“skin in the game”) to assure good quality of contributions. 
This way such blockchain-based crypto-economical tools, possibly in tandem with the aforementioned CBPR, 
can also be key to address the notorious reproducibility crisis of science [26, 27]. The pervasive failure to 
replicate previous findings often roots in inappropriate practices of science, e.g., poor experimental design 
leading, almost unavoidably, to variability between the groups [28], hypothesizing after the results are known 
(“HARKing”) [29, 30], selective analysis and reporting [31-33], p-value hacking [34, 35], and missing raw 




estimated at 50% in preclinical research, induced high economical loss of approximately US$28 billion per 
annum. In addition to waste of money and time, the poor reproducibility of data tends to markedly demotivate 
the idealistic scientific community. 
 
Figure 1 Buzz words in science and RTD which directly connect to equivalent 
elements in blockchain technology. The central objective is to create blocks of trust- 
and truthful knowledge / innovation and log them a public or permissioned ledger. 
Credibility of contributions is rewarded and staked by work efforts and reputation. 
Ownership and confidentiality of results depend on the source of funding, and may 
be kept as corporate secret or made public. The construct is framed by mechanisms 
to assure quality and credibility of results on the left, and involvement of the 
community on the right-hand side. 
Furthermore, the recent shift towards open access in scientific publishing, even though widely regarded as 
worthwhile and necessary, has led to detrimental side effects; driven by profit, a slew of open access journals 
publish quasi any submission, since the costs have entirely shifted from the readers or subscribing libraries to 
the authors. This unintentional, very counterproductive development has led to a noticeable rise of such rather 
predatory journals with substandard editorial boards, peer reviewers and papers, and even to the loss of parts 
of the scientific record when their entirely profit focused publishing houses suddenly dissolve. This severe 
problem could well be addressed by increased transparency of the peer review system, as well as a robust 
identity and reputation systems of both authors, reviewers and journals, all of which can be successfully 
addressed by blockchain technologies, as described below. 
This paper proposes a radically novel decentralized concept utilizing blockchain mechanisms based on 
reputation systems, betting, secondary markets and social networking to deliver well-qualified consensus for 
(best possible) “truth” (as validated according to commonly accepted scientific procedures) on delivery and 
assessment of plans, work and forecasts, to eventually amend “blocks” of scientifically or commercially 
valuable artefacts, knowledge or know-how to the public or corporate ledger of science & RTD, respectively. 




update the way science and RTD have been organized over the last centuries, to ultimately confer optimum 
benefit to people, societies, and economies. 
 
2 BLOCKCHAIN 
Beyond its foundation in computer science, cryptography and finance, blockchain technology is not 
monolithic; its sophistication and application development now involve concepts from a wide range of 
disciplines encompassing economics, game theory, banking, risk management, data science, education, law, 
administration, political science, psychology, ethics, arts and social sciences. While gaining a thorough 
understanding of blockchain tends to be somewhat challenging, its diverse contributions bear strong potential 
to produce disruptive ideas, concepts and solutions that continuously drive the evolution of the overarching 
technology. In the following sections we provide an insight into the different facets of this Distributed Ledger 
Technology (DLT) [39] to then lay the ground for substantially improving legacy organization and processes 
in science and RTD. 
2.1 A.  DIGITAL CURRENCY 
Blockchain originates from a white paper, authored by the pseudonymous person or group “Satoshi 
Nakamoto”, which launched the virtual currency “Bitcoin” in 2008/2009 [40-43]. By employing a 
computational “proof-of work” (PoW) in conjunction with incentivization for honest participation, this 
document described the world’s first realization of a peer-to-peer version of electronic cash that offers 
algorithm-enforced scarcity, solves the double-spending problem of digital assets, and allows online payments 
to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution.  
Integrity and consensus on amending new “blocks” is achieved through a clever combination of cryptography 
and a decentralised peer-to-peer network of miners to validate and nodes to store a common, tamper-free, 
immutable, and time-stamped distributed ledger (file). The protocol runs without intermediaries, e.g., a central 
bank, whose monetary policies may be directed by short-term political objectives of the ruling administration, 
rather than protecting the interest of people, especially depositors, against inflation1 and devaluation; uniquely, 
no physical goods such as bills, coins or precious metals are issued, stored, split, or transported, thus 
drastically reducing cost of ownership, security, and usage. 
Bitcoin and many other cryptocurrencies may be traded on conventional or decentralised exchanges (“DEX”), 
“hodled” [44], i.e., held on the long term (“hodled”) in the prospect of large future profit or increased utility, 
saved to protect wealth against inflation or for longer-term gains in on- or off-chain wallets or vaults, or used 
to buy real-world goods and to access services with an expanding number of merchants [45]. By the time of 
writing, Bitcoin has reached a market far above 200 billion USD, thus being ranked the world’s 6th largest 
currency (depending on the referenced category of money supply). It is followed by Ethereum (ETH) [46, 47], 
the global payment network Ripple (XRP) [48] with about 45 and 13.2 billion US$, respectively, and a host of 
further, often special purpose, “altcoins”. 
2.2 COMPUTING POWER 
Trust in Bitcoin is established through demanding PoW, i.e., staking huge computational power in a race to 
unravel a cryptographic “puzzle” (or, more accurately, by finding a partial hash collision through brute force), 
which nowadays requires designated, application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) that frequently 
concentrate at larger-scale mining “farms”. Blockchains are commonly designed to be “Byzantine Fault 
tolerant” (BFT) [49], i.e., only an entity able to control a significant fraction (arguably specified between 1/3 
to 51% under real-world circumstances) of the so-called “hash rate” (or alternative resource) would have a 
realistic chance to manipulate and thus devastatingly compromise trust in the blockchain; such attacks are 
efficiently counteracted by attractive rewards for mining or staking. It is widely accepted that only seminal 
 
1 This philosophy is also carved into Bitcoin’s genesis block stating "The Times 03/Jan/2009 Chancellor on 




enhancements of hash rates, e.g., by next-generation quantum computing, might pose a serious challenge to 
securing blockchains (more precisely: public PoW based chains that work on hash-collision based cost-
functions) in the longer-term future.   
2.3 PROGRAMMABLE MONEY 
Another milestone flanking the emergence of blockchain technology was the introduction of “smart contracts” 
which allowed the development of decentralised apps (“DApps”) that are equipped with a locally running user 
interface (UI), with the business logic executed in a decentralised fashion, e.g., on the Ethereum Virtual 
Machine (EVM) as part of a network [50]. In this “Web 3.0”2 technology launched in 2014, the execution of 
transactions on assets can be coupled to conditions represented by code that is permanently engraved and 
verified on the blockchain. Such programmability of a trusted digital currency has given DLT another 
tremendous, at times somewhat overhyped boost in the second half of the 2010s, in particular in the field of 
decentralised finance (“DeFi”) [51], which is presently spurred by hot topics like “yield farming” / “liquidity 
mining” [52-58].  
High volatility of exchange rates with fiat currencies has been addressed by stablecoins, often soft- or hard-
pegged against the US dollar [59-61]. Some companies insure against adverse events [62, 63] and 
professionally audit smart-contract constructs [64]. However, enforcement of severe regulation, e.g., around 
know-your-customer (KYC) and anti-money-laundering (“AML”) compliance policies [65] required in 
conventional financial services, is still regarded as major roadblocks for further, land-slide proliferation; while 
there is significant support for introduction of “crypto” from the corporate sector and important interest 
groups, increasing support is signaled from government agencies who would need to legally sanction certain 
steps and support integration with their work flows [66-71]. Alternative public blockchain-enabled 
cryptoassets like Bitcoin, numerous countries are seriously contemplating the introduction of Central Bank 
Digital Currencies (CBDCs). 
2.4 ORACLES 
Smart contracts may be deemed blockchain-based algorithms that deterministically trigger transactions, for 
instance, of cryptocurrencies, upon meeting well-defined conditionals on external input data, referred to as 
“oracles”. Blockchains themselves provide trust on information that can be sourced from its very own digital 
ecosystem, e.g., that a certain date has passed, or a certain amount of funds is available on a given crypto 
account. However, any real-world data feeds, e.g., on stock values, exchange rates, opinion polls or data 
obtained from the Internet of Things (IoT), to on-chain decision-making algorithms constitute potential chinks 
caused by poor quality or even forgery, and would thus devastatingly undermine trust in blockchain controlled 
processes. Access to reliable off-chain facts by properly vetted and incentivized “reporters” is thus 
instrumental for the implementation and acceptance of oracle-based smart contracts controlling transactions of 
value. 
There are different types of oracles [72]: Software and hardware oracles receive data from online sources, and 
real-world information from physical sensors, respectively. In inbound and outbound oracles, digital 
information is fed to or issued from the blockchain. Consensus-based oracles rely on verification and approval 
by a cohort of individuals or groups. A range of initiatives already provide various forms of such blockchain-
connected oracles [73-80]. Especially consensus-based oracles play an important role in this paper as they best 
reflect the well-proven trust-finding process already underpinning science and RTD. 
2.5 PREDICTION MARKETS 
Uncertainty on future events and developments remains a fundamental issue in our lives, economies, and 
societies. Examples are weather, climate, natural or manmade disasters, conflicts, health, election results, 
consumer behaviour, financial markets and economic growth from a macroscopic and corporate angle as well 
as advancements in science and technology. Undoubtedly, there is a huge value in having prior knowledge 
about upcoming events, e.g., to advise allocation of resources or to pre-emptively mitigate their expected 
 




fallout. Organisations like insurers, investors, governments, and companies rely on thorough data collection 
and analysis to have the best possible appraisal. 
While small panels of pundits may be consulted for their insights, the collective wisdom of the crowds [81-83] 
has often delivered an astonishingly reliable source for predicting the future events, e.g., the outbreak of 
pandemics [84, 85], possibly because a broad population provides a multitude of information, perspectives 
and experiences to average out individual bias. However, it is also reasonable to put higher weight on 
forecasts uttered by specialists displaying a thoroughly verified “reputation”, i.e., a proven track record, 
untarnished credibility and relevant expertise in the area under consideration for optimizing the accuracy. For 
example, artificial intelligence (AI) supported DeFi platforms have been launched, involving reputation-
staked collective intelligence of investors from the crowd to direct an open hedge fund [86]. 
Its combination of smart contract and trust without intermediaries has been a fertile ground to install several 
prediction markets on blockchains [87-92]; these next-generation platforms allow “anyone”, including 
automated market makers (AMMs), to create trade pairs and settle their “bets” at different stages prior to the 
completion of the event. As any crypto exchange, attracting sufficient liquidity is paramount for the viability 
of these platforms. 
Evidently, precise definition of possible outcomes constitutes a critical prerequisite for setting up and settling 
the market. There are outcomes that are of binary, i.e., yes-no nature, or that can be expressed in exact 
numbers. Yet, even those events may fall out of a set list of outcomes, e.g., by cancellation or changing of 
goal posts due to unforeseeable force majeure. This may be handled by declaring the bet invalid followed by 
returning deposits to all stakeholders. 
However, even such a decision may be disputable, possibly favoring certain stakeholders while leaving some 
betters feeling betrayed. In this case trust in the platform is enhanced by providing a pre-defined and fair 
arbitration process [93-95]. Such consensus finding by broadly accepted dispute resolution schemes will also 
be required for judging on more complex outcomes, e.g., if a “soft” scientific or business goal cannot be 
expressed in a simple quantitative measure. 
The main vulnerability of these blockchain-based betting portals resides in the accountability of oracles 
reporting on real-world data, i.e., they may accidently, erroneously or deliberately feed inaccurate or untimely 
information which prompt irreversible “pay outs” linked to unstoppable smart contracts. Blockchain based 
prediction markets consequently need to put particular emphasis on trustful input sources; for assuring 
credibility or “best possible trust”, staking “skin in the game” as collateral thus needs to be demanded from 
reporters, e.g., by appropriate (crypto-)assets or formalized reputation, while penalizing deviation from the 
final consensus. Mechanisms for establishing trustful oracles have been developed, e.g., in the context of IoT 
[96]. 
2.6 CURATION MARKETS 
Also in response to adverse crosswinds by regulatory agencies challenging the legitimacy of initial coin 
offerings (ICOs), so-called “token bonding curves” (TBCs) [97] have been devised to implement legally less 
controversial idea markets [98]. Tokens may be purchased and traded for proposals and ongoing projects; 
staked crypto deposits are safely stored on the blockchain to guarantee continuous liquidity. Their value is 
defined by a publicly accessible formula, for instance, with a price proportional to the number of tokens issued 
at a given point in time; in this exemplary model, investors in these curation markets [99] thus profit when 
more tokens circulate at the point of selling than at buying. Similar to conventional betting, stockbrokers or 
currency exchanges, a fraction of the revenues may be commissioned in a well-defined fashion to fund the 
project activities, and to support the creation of trustful prediction markets that can wisely inform decision 
making. 
To avoid Ponzi schemes, rules must be established for an end game when the project has reached its 
milestones, e.g., delivered commercially, for the conversion of virtual token investments into real-world value. 
As direct pecuniary remuneration may raise the ire of federal authorities who might categorize them as 
securities to which rather tight regulation would apply to, tokens might be converted into formalized 
reputation or voting rights in community-driven initiatives seeking related expertise. 




The success of community-based approaches involving collective intelligence is intimately hinged on 
engagement of a critical mass of participants. The same applies to blockchain technologies themselves which 
can only thrive if a substantial number of active users and providers of independent nodes perform mining, 
maintenance, and upgrades to sustain the network. 
A variety schemes have been applied to stimulate employee participation in traditional companies; 
interestingly, it turns out that accompanying recognition and acknowledgement of quality work has a stronger 
long-term effect on employee motivation and performance than (stand-alone) bonuses and pay rises [100]. 
Incentivization or collaboration by blockchain-secured token systems has already been implemented by 
several big corporations. For instance, the Enterprise Ethereum Alliance (EEA) [101], backed by 
multinationals like Microsoft and Intel, issues reward and reputation tokens to stimulate collaboration on 
activities like editing and contributing to specifications, and adding code in software development. Penalty 
tokens may reflect lack of engagement or infringement of project delivery within target budgets, timelines and 
specifications. Spotting bugs and other flaws might be incentivized by posting bounties [102, 103], which may 
also be open to the public and may be rewarded through centralized or decentralized decision making 
mechanisms. 
2.8 TOKENIZATION OF ASSETS 
The ownership of certain unique assets such as real estate, vehicles, memorabilia, antiques, artwork [104-106] 
and other intellectual property (IP) representing intangible creations of human creativity [107] is normally 
handled by publicly sanctioned administrative entities, e.g., land registries or patent and trademark offices. 
Traditionally, the final proof of ownership is still linked to the possession or filing of a paper document that 
needs to be managed, transferred, archived, and kept accessible in a manner that is highly resilient to forgery, 
theft, disasters and physical decay over long, even historic periods of time. 
As opposed to money or commodities like precious metals or natural resources, this specific class of goods is 
not directly interchangeable, i.e., title of such assets may need to be swapped, e.g., through cumbersome 
escrow and distribution mechanisms. For instance, the deeds of a house might not be divided in as straight-
forwardly as 100 units of a fiat currency might be split into several bills or coins that can be passed out to 
individuals. Also, a trustful, uninterrupted record of previous ownership, ideally tracing back to the origin, 
minimizes chances of legal disputes and counterfeit, and thus constitutes a high value. 
The enormous potential of the distributed, unstoppable, time-stamped, cryptographically secured and thus 
inviolable public ledger to document non-repudiable ownership of this type of non-interchangeable assets in 
an “internet of value” is very evident. So-called “Non-Fungible Tokens” (NFTs, known as ERC-721 tokens 
[108] on the Ethereum blockchain) have been implemented on blockchains [109, 110]. These NFTs have first 
been utilized for trading unique digital artwork as part of online gaming [111]; by now, several blockchain 
initiatives have extended the concept of NFTs to real-world assets [106, 112-115] through digital security 
tokens. 
Other projects also target recording and providing selective access to well-verified professional and 
educational qualifications on designated blockchains [116], e.g., to facilitate admission to academic programs, 
for streamlining corporate recruitment and for optimizing human resources (HR) [117]. 
2.9 FUNDING 
In addition to conventional sponsorship by investors, foundations, public agencies, and charities through 
injection of fiat currency, blockchain technologies offer bespoke funding mechanisms which are linked to the 
trust without middlemen conferred by the decentralised, crypto-secured ledger and its smart contracts. 
Funding can, for instance, be raised by minting project-specific digital “coins”, e.g., so-called ERC-20 tokens 
[118] on Ethereum [50], which may be (pre-)mined and traded according to a transparent protocol. The value 
of these tokens is then freely determined by market dynamics. On top of their financial value, these crypto-
currencies might provide a “proof of stake” (PoS), e.g., for voting on upgrades or seats on arbitration panels, 
or for settling utility (transaction) fees charged to sustain the ecosystem of the underlying blockchain. 
Trust in such monetary seigniorage [119], i.e., the difference between the value of new money and the cost of 
their creation, is best supported best by open source release of code, proper documentation and credible 




critical risk to trust in projects, which is particularly pronounced with tiny trade volumes and limited numbers 
of independent stakeholders in the market. 
Financial authorities have frequently categorized cryptoassets issued through initial coin offerings (ICO) for 
funding blockchain projects as equivalent to securities, which would require compliance to stringent rules 
similar to initial public offerings (IPOs) of “shares” on traditional (centralised) stock exchanges. Such 
classification requires enormous efforts on compliance. Alternative models have been developed for tokens 
not representing classical assets and ownership. They may be offered in initial (security) token offerings, ITOs 
or STOs, respectively, and may then be traded in secondary markets. Also the issue of legally sound 
incorporation of businesses (“LAOs”) using crypto-economic mechanisms has been elaborated [120]. The 
attraction of such democratized decision-making organization to venture capital (VC) funding remains to be 
seen. 
2.10 ORGANIZATION 
As it has already surfaced in the previous sections, the availability of smart contracts on blockchains opens 
manifold avenues for rethinking classical approaches to the organization of projects. From a certain point of 
view, novel implementations seek to extend trust finding by decentralization, majority vote and PoW / PoS 
from the core of blockchain to the entire management structure. This applies to commercial projects, e.g., to 
direct management and investment decisions in DeFi by sourcing the wisdom of the crowd; such decentralised 
governance, e.g., as implemented by liquid (delegated) democracy [121] based establishment of consensus, 
also invigorates trust and community spirit in initiatives pursuing “Commons”, i.e., shared goals on 
advancement of blockchain technologies or for the good of mankind. 
Voting rights of stakeholders might be weighted by the amount (crypto-)assets which, in addition to purchase, 
may be earned by quality contributions to the entire gamut of the project such as work, validation, assessment, 
management, promotion, community building, forecasts, arbitration, governance, and by running 
infrastructure and further development of the underlying blockchain [122-124]. 
As the pinnacle of such developments, so-called Decentralised Autonomous Organisations [59, 122, 125-130] 
have been launched in the second half of the 2010s; these “DAOs” encode the complete organisational 
structure of a cooperative project into (a set of) smart contracts. DAOs are rapidly evolving into social tools 
and organizations that pursue a collective agenda for the benefit of the community or societies in general [123, 
131]. While some of these community-run, smart-contract constructs have exposed major weaknesses or 
failed [126, 132, 133], e.g., due to vicious cyber-attacks or exploitation enabled by flawed or ill-coded smart 
contracts, several DAOs, some of them attracting up to billion-dollar volumes of crowdfunding [20, 134, 135], 
have been successfully established in the meantime. The launch of DAOs and DApps is frequently 
accompanied by posting bounties for spotting bugs and vulnerabilities in the code. 
2.11 RESOURCES SHARING AND CIRCULAR ECONOMY 
Depending on the field the blockchain technology is applied to, organizations can define a specific set of 
smart-contract implemented governance rules which suit the objectives of the supporting communities. These 
guidelines may improve, for instance, fairness, create equal opportunity or minimize environmental footprint, 
e.g., by blockchain-enabled sharing or even circular economies. 
Examples for governing shared resources by DAOs are computing storage and processing, vehicles, office 
space, laboratories and virtual resources. Blockchain-leveraged tokenization may incentivize actions that bring 
value to communities, thereby shifting the focus on reutilizing idle or available resources which otherwise are 
very difficult to account for and are usually ignored. 
2.12 CURRENT ADVANCES 
In addition to coordination with governments and public agencies, which is supported by a rising number of 
large-scale corporate stakeholders [136], the blockchain community advances several technical aspects of 




Transaction Speed and Fees 
As a victim of its unexpected popularity, severe deficiencies in scalability of the original peer-to-peer concept 
of Bitcoin-derived blockchains based on PoW have surfaced. Transaction throughput still dwells many orders 
of magnitudes below established systems, e.g., for facilitating payments with common credit card systems, 
albeit still generally faster than conventional banking; the limited bandwidth also led to soaring, occasionally 
even business impeding utility fees, e.g., for “gas” on the Ethereum blockchain powering the majority of 
DeFi. 
Strategies such as increased block sizes [137-139] as well as refinements like “sharding” [140], side chains 
[141], “ZK rollups” [142, 143], recursive internetwork architecture [124] and the “lightning network” [144], 
which resort to mechanisms like transient forking or off-chain processing, are currently elaborated and 
integrated into different blockchains. With their upgrade to version 2.0 expected for 2021 [47], the impactful 
Ethereum blockchain plans to transition from PoW to PoS to effectively tackle problems of transaction 
throughput and fees. 
Data Management 
As designed for the rather small information affiliated with financial transactions, the blockchain data 
structure is not well suited for storing large files. Indeed, it would be orders of magnitude more expensive to 
store a given amount of data on blockchain’s ledger file distributed on a peer-to-peer network than on a single 
computer. Decentralised architectures [145-148] and certain access protocols [149, 150] have been paired with 
blockchain to provide untampered data sets. A common method is to generate a cryptographic hash, i.e., a 
unique, short, fixed size fingerprint for a large data file which sensitively changes by even the slightest 
modification. Only this brief hash and a link to the file is stored on the blockchain. Perspectives for 
blockchain-based data governance have been conceived [151]. 
Also, the ingestion of external data into the system in a way that provides a high degree of data integrity poses 
a technical challenge. And even if it can be proven that data has not been manipulated before entry, 
identifying the relationship between the transacting author and the data might not be completely automatable, 
although processes and protocols emerge, that might provide a foundation for automated and decentral rights 
management [152]. 
Interoperability, Configurability and Sustainability 
There is a vast “zoo” of blockchain technologies and cryptocurrencies. Even the most established ones hardly 
communicate with each other. Large initiatives have formed towards building an “internet of blockchains” 
(IBC) which aims to establish standards and interoperability [153] of private and permissionless (public) 
blockchain protocols [154] as well as decentralised mechanisms for inter-chain exchange of crypto assets, 
e.g., atomic swaps [155] or DEX [156]. Similar to tool boxes for setting up web pages on classical internet, 
there are also initiatives to support rapid configuration of modular, open-source blockchains [157, 158].  
With the skyrocketing popularity of ICOs, e.g., during their short-lived hype in 2017, the issue of 
sustainability of blockchains arose, i.e., what happens to the blockchain after the initial amount of funding has 
been spent, or its leaders lose interest and walk away. Amongst several constructs, treasury models which lock 
funds into smart contracts that are curated by stakeholders have been introduced to provide for continuous 
support and improvement [124]. 
Power Consumption 
The substantial environmental footprint required to entertain the trust-constituting computing power as well as 
the tendency towards dominating the hash rate by an oligopoly of miners through such PoW is deemed a 
major problem by many interest groups. More flexible cryptographic challenges that are unfavorable for ASIC 
mining and / or consume much less energy, such as (delegated) PoS [47, 159-161] protocols, have been 
implemented on various other blockchains in the meantime. Alternatively, widely trusted institutions like 
universities may partner to form a small network of nodes in a public-permissioned blockchain. In proof-of-
authority (PoA) based consensus formation [162], the consortium members vouch their valuable real-world 
reputation, rather than expensive computing power (PoW) or crypto assets (PoS), to underpin the trust and 




Ethereum, the second largest blockchain by market cap, is gradually replacing PoW with a sophisticated, PoS-
based consensus mechanism (amongst other improvements, e.g., regarding scalability) [163]. PoA or PoA 
consensus finding might be preferrable for blockchain-based projects in the scientific / academic community. 
Participation Models in Blockchains 
The organizational properties of a blockchain fall into essentially two broad categories: public or private and 
permissioned or permissionless [164]. The decentralised ledgers of Bitcoin [41] or Ethereum [50] are 
purposely permissionless, open and public, implying that there is no central authority restricting access and 
participation in the consensus mechanism, thus providing trust and neutrality while eliminating censorship and 
regulation across global communities. On the contrary, private or permissioned blockchains [165] restrict 
different levels of access to the ledger file and participation in the consensus mechanism; they have been 
devised to address concerns regarding, e.g., performance, ownership, confidentiality, privacy, security, 
control, governance, scalability, configurability, consensus finding and environmental footprint. 
Such federated or consortium blockchains are well established in the corporate world [166-169], but are 
perceived controversial by larger parts of the crypto-community. They tend to consider these permissioned 
setups as a variant of a conventional corporate database where a central authority tasks verifiers and 
authorizers, thus lacking major features in terms of securing trust and protection against vulnerability, 
compared to their public counterparts.  
Organization and Governance 
The term “DAO” is not clearly defined (yet). Its incorporation might not bode well with the local legislative 
framework and entail huge risks for its (identifiable) stakeholders, e.g., regarding liability. Possible 
advancements are Distributed Autonomous Associations (DAAs), a checks and balances system where 
individual roles are replaced by expert panels to disperse power from single points of failure. Suitable 
decision-making processes need to be clearly defined, e.g., consensus-driven liquid democracy governance 
delegating day-to-day business to their appointed managers who periodically report and seek approval on 
business-critical or strategic issues. 
3 APPLICATION TO SCIENCE & RTD 
The spirit at the heart of blockchain may be articulated as finding trust and consensus within a non-custodial 
network of independent, potentially even malicious players; the integrity of the blockchain is fortified by a 
transparent, reward-based competition which demands risking some form of collateral from participants, e.g., 
by investing in costly installation and operation of cutting-edge mining infrastructure. 
Smart contracts and DApps have significantly extended the scope of applications that can be addressed by 
blockchain technologies; staking of crypto-assets and formalized reputation incentivize credible reporting of 
best possible truth to blockchain oracles and prediction markets, to optimize decision making on allocation of 
resources towards achieving common project goals. Smart contracts have also enabled new asset types such as 
NFTs [170], and sophisticated manifestations of self-governance by liquid democracy [121] and DAOs [125]. 
First initiatives for providing a digital ecosystem to support collaboration on innovation processes through 
blockchain mechanisms have already surfaced [171-177]. 
Similarly, the research community rewards scientific discovery and technology development as well as 
finding consensus on their validation to eventually add new “blocks” of community-verified knowledge to a 
public, “ledger-equivalent” library that is captured in widely accessible, perpetual archives [178]. Strong 
trends towards self-organization, autonomy of decision making, e.g., through peer review of publications and 
funding proposals, and even decentralization and competitive parallelization have always been a principal 
element of academic research. 
Yet, the ranking and reward systems applying to researchers and institutions as well as career promotions, 
appointments to committees and invitations for high-caliber talks is not so rarely based on hidden rule sets and 
backroom arrangements. The valuation of intellectual assets, such as publications, inventions, and awards, 
remains somewhat obscure and inconsistent. Importantly, the community-aspect of achievements is often 
poorly captured and artificially restricted to small groups, rather than acknowledging and thus incentivizing 




institutionalized individuals. Greater involvement of the community, e.g., through hackathons and bounties, 
would certainly facilitate the formation of a critical mass of users, developers, and promoters, and thus 
energize fly-wheel effects to increase footprint and sustainability of projects. 
This section sketches the future scenario of a more inclusive, community-based approach towards science and 
RTD organized as a sophisticated betting game; blockchain orchestrates an arsenal of crypto-economic 
instruments for finding trust and best possible truth at maximum transparency and minimum administrative 
costs for planning, funding, execution, management, assessment, arbitration, and exploitation of science and 
RTD projects. With some adequate modifications respecting the rule set and workflows of the corporate 
sector, the opportunity to flexibly tap into the increasingly broad pool of talent, expertise, creativity, labour 
and facilities within a global village, rather than limiting contributions to centralised RTD headquarters, might 
largely outweigh reservations, e.g., regarding ownership and protection of IP. 
3.1 SPECIFICS OF SCIENCE & RTD 
Investing in science and RTD is tied to a certain expectation towards the future, e.g., to address a material 
need or find the answer to an important issue or question in society. In a legacy approach, a rather small 
cohort of experts is consulted to identify relevant topics, evaluate proposals, validate data and assess 
outcomes. 
Blockchain is so far mainly driven by software development for improving its own ecosystem and for its 
reach into new application spaces like industrial or food supply chains [124, 179, 180], authenticity of 
precious commodities [181-183] and enterprise solutions [166, 168]. Blockchain technologies also empower 
DeFi by creating novel financial instruments and investment vehicles such as yield farming [52] for scooping 
arbitrage gains, synthetic assets [56], barrier-free, financially inclusive (micro-)payment systems [48], DEX 
[184, 185] with automated market makers (AMMs), and services for auditing or insuring against crypto-
specific risks [63]. While making smaller economic impact, also significant work on Commons led by social 
objectives, to illuminate information processing [186] and to support charitable initiatives has been carried out 
[131, 187].  
Somewhat on the contrary, most members of the science and RTD community, whether on the payroll of 
academia or industry, are primarily motivated by creation of knowledge; in addition to bonuses or share 
options in industry, their commitment and devotion is stimulated by recognition, respect, attention, prestige, 
individual fulfilment, funding, personal career opportunity, self-fulfillment, joy of creativity, identification 
with their organization, utility to users and society, altruism, and, last but not least, having a saying in terms of 
management, refereeing or governance, and opportunity for promoting a topic they find important in front of 
key stakeholders and large audiences. 
As outlined in the preceding sections, the token economy that can be quite uniquely staged by blockchain-
enabled reputation systems [188] is able to cater for objectively awarding and safely recording such personal 
achievements, stake them as collateral for quality and credibility of contributions, and to improve prediction 
markets. Hence, we propose here for the first time a token-economy as the basis to garner valuable 
community engagement for delivering top-quality, well-reproducible and high-impact science and RTD. 
This cooperative approach reflects characteristic features of the scientific community like self-organization, 
autonomy, open competition, decentralization, and transparency to set a solid foundation for establishing trust, 
credibility, and objectivity in finding best possible “truth”. Especially the clear trend towards virtualization, 
e.g., digital twin approaches, opens novel avenues towards widening participation of a global crowd to value 
creation, even to a novel type of freelance researcher, e.g., through contributing intriguing hypotheses, novel 
concepts, improved modelling, simulation, and validation services. 
3.2 SCIENCE & RTD - THROUGH THE EYES OF BLOCKCHAIN 
Along Figure 3, we illustrate the manifold similarities between the fabric of blockchain and the mechanisms 
underpinning the classic community of science and RTD. In DLT, transaction data is periodically collated, 
mined in an open cryptographic race (in public PoW networks), collectively verified, and selected according 
to pre-defined metrics and algorithms for amending a block to the existing chain. Crypto-economical 





Figure 2 Organization of science & RTD by a token-based crypto-economy. A white 
paper documents a basic protocol, management structures and reward systems 
which are encoded and executed on a blockchain. Governance and arbitration 
following liquid democracy schemes are at the heart of decision flexible updating of 
rule sets, directing and conflict resolution. Blockchain mechanisms such as ICOs / 
ITOs / STOs, seigniorage and arbitrage generate conventional, fiat-convertible 
funding. A cohort of crypto tokens can be awarded to users in the crowd, e.g., for 
contributions such as ideas, planning, work, validation, forecasting, exploitation, 
and even to externals by learning about or referencing the project, and thus raise 
attention. The recipients might deploy these rewards to increase voting rights in the 
liquid democracy governance, to polish up their curriculum vitae (CV), to claim 
ownership in intellectual property (IP), and, in a potential secondary market, trade 
them into other crypto assets. 
On a conceptual level, there are remarkable similarities of blockchain to the modus operandi of the scientific 
community. Scientific discoveries may, for instance, be expressed by a hypothesis that is embedded into a 
context, described by a model of understanding, verified by established experimental protocols and methods 
of data analysis. These “blocks” representing scientific discoveries, research data or technological inventions 
are then released to the scientific community for assessment and validation by peers according to widely 
accepted criteria and methods that tend to be specific to each research discipline, e.g., [189]. 
To optimize quality, and to avoid manipulation and scamming, authors stake their reputation (PoS). Upon 
approval, the blocks are appended to the “ledger of knowledge” that is archived in various forms, e.g., 
publicly in journal publications or patents, or in internal documents stored on institutional or corporate 




theories (“chains”) transiently compete until sufficient evidence (“blocks”) has been aggregated to convince a 
critical mass of the community.  
Having identified these analogies to protocols in blockchain, we notice that involvement of the scientific 
community is highly relevant to reviewing, but contributions of the crowd at large to the creation of initial 
intellectual property (IP), validation and dissemination are rather poorly incentivized and acknowledged 
(Figure 3). The following sections describe how a blockchain-based token economy highly encourages a 
collaborative approach for the mutual benefit of contributors and the objectives of the project, as illustrated in 
Figure 4. 
 
Figure 3 Analogies between science and RTD and the distributed ledger 
technologies (based on PoW). Permissionless blockchains, such as Bitcoin or 
Ethereum, can be interpreted as cooperative peer-to-peer networks of independent 
players for growing a record of transactions that are bundled in consecutive blocks. 
These packets of transaction data are competitively and redundantly created, time-
stamped, verified and selected for inclusion according to a deterministic, code-based 
consensus protocol. Staking PoW through participation in an enormous group 
mining effort, reputation by PoS and utility costs mitigate spamming and reward 
contributions to securing the integrity of the decentralised, non-repudiable ledger. 
“Hashing”, e.g., by Merkle trees, intertwines new with existing blocks to firmly 
secure the blockchain. The “blocks” in science and RTD may be IP documented by 
articles, internal reports or patent fillings that describe new knowledge or know-
how that has been reviewed by peers in the community. Trust and transparency are 
afforded by referencing and working according to established, collectively accepted 
methods. This IP is captured, e.g., as non-fungible tokens (NFTs), on public or 
private, quasi-eternal and unforgeable archives curated by trusted journals, 
publishing houses or patent offices. Authors, inventors, validators, and referees 
engage in a “race” to be first to add high-impact and well-reproducible results to 
this public “ledger of knowledge”. Their successful efforts may be rewarded by 




citations and overall recognition / prestige the community. Spamming of the ledger 
with “junk” is averted by peer review and risking reputation. Both systems prove to 
autonomously function without central authority to certify the integrity of data 
blocks and knowledge, respectively. 
3.3 TOKENS 
Blockchain technologies can uniquely implement transparent rule sets on its tamper-free and immutable 
ledger to incentivize, credit and reward a broad repertoire of community contributions. We first illustrate the 
benefits such a token economy can offer for science and RTD projects (Figure 4). Evidently, seigniorage 
[119], ICOs, ITOs, STOs, and dynamically evolving crowdfunding [20, 122, 190, 191] can channel financial 
resources at different stages of progression into a project. These assets may be used to directly recruit, 
crowdsource, and incentivize workforce, idea creation, contributions of expertise, management, and other 
services. 
Historically, free-market economies, potentially padded with rule sets on anti-trust to avoid monopolies and 
social aspects, have proven to outperform centralised, state-directed economies, despite potential duplication 
and friction losses between competitors. In the same way, such “tokenization” can drive a healthy rivalry, also 
termed “competitive parallelization” [5], towards performance enhancement of the full gamut of project 
contributions, whether internally or externally crowdsourced [192], thus optimizing the overall outcome of 
science and RTD projects. 
 
Figure 4 Innovation potential for science & RTD projects through crypto-
economically incentivized involvement of collective intelligence. Core blockchain 
technologies provide trust and trust-finding mechanisms without requiring a central 
authority. Smart contracts enable skin-in-the-game staked prediction markets, 
novel, liquid-democracy style governance schemes involving formalized reputation, 
a tamper-proof and time-stamped ledger to register intellectual property (IP) which 
may be represented and traded as non-fungible token (NFT). In addition to 
conventional mechanisms, project funding can arise from seigniorage and curation 




project contributions, e.g., work, validation, promotion and education, collective 
intelligence through remuneration and reputation tokens to thus optimize the 
project outcomes while acknowledging contributions from individual stakeholders. 
In reputation systems [161, 188, 193, 194], tokens are earned or burned, depending on the best correlation 
between predictions and target outcomes [86]. Skin in the game schemes can effectively “dilute” 
compromised assessment, e.g., by malicious participants setting up a large number of pseudonymous 
identities and using them to gain a disproportionately large influence. Mechanisms for counteracting such 
“Sybil attacks” [195], e.g., through “proof-of-identity”, have been elaborated [196, 197]. Reputation tokens 
can mirror track record, e.g., obtained for quality and speed of project work, validation, advise, education, 
team building, promotion and leadership [101], to substantiate the overall credibility of contributors. In 
contrast with the current state where even the number of citations of a particular paper or author is usually 
only available under subscription models, blockchain implementation would offer rendering such records 
publicly available. 
Similar to artwork or collectibles [104, 198], non-fungible tokens (NFTs) can issue a legally valid time-
stamped proof of knowledge of intellectual assets, e.g., by provision of hypotheses, methodology, 
experimental design, theoretical framework, supporting data set and statistical interpretation, to indisputably 
claim inventorship to be recorded on patent applications or authorship on a scientific discovery. Portals 
already exist to capture and manage access to such IP [162, 199] and data [149, 150, 199-202]. 
In addition, many existing implementations rely on asset identification based on cryptographic hashes to act as 
generic signatures of data. Although they are well suited to uniquely identify a certain data instance, their lack 
of locality-preserving and perceptual hashing properties seriously limits application in the copyright and 
patent domain, especially considering automated processing. In order to unlock the full potential of this 
technology, alternative fingerprinting algorithms like International Standard Content Code (ISCC) [203] need 
to be explored. As patent and copyright law are intrinsically complex, the process involved might not be 
completely automatable; different instruments, such as the Open Content Certification Protocol (OCCP) 
[204], aim to provide a foundation for machine-to-machine communication and technology based trust, while 
still allowing for a soft factor of human assessment to be injected into the system. 
Commercially relevant IP represented by NFTs might also be better tradable through tokens, especially for 
academic institutions whose technology transfer offices (TTOs) are usually netting significant losses. Issues 
around regulation and confidentiality might be addressed by permissioned blockchains [165]. To embed this 
novel mechanism into a legally sound framework, buy-in from patent offices is still to be pushed on the 
political level. 
Even beyond such core innovative contributions, the entire team might be further incentivized by (potentially 
pan-institutional) reputation tokens, e.g., obtained for work, validation, advise, education, team building, 
leadership and promotion [101]. Smart contracts can also time-lock tokens, i.e., their “pay out” might be 
linked to sustainable outcomes that are evaluated as results have created measurable impact, rather than 
encouraging a transient flash in the pan. 
Towards mustering a critical mass, tokens can also be issued to (external) users for popularizing the project 
[205], e.g., through referrals and postings, or by proof of “attention”, e.g., through completing specific 
tutorials and browsing activities [206, 207]. This, at first sight, altruistic give-away approach makes better 
sense if promotion is considered as instrumental for engaging a critical number of engaged users. In a certain 
way, researchers nowadays already accept similar marketing expenses, e.g., in the form of registration fees for 
presenting their results at conferences or for publishing open-access articles to optimize their reach and future 
citation counts. Furthermore, tokens might be passed out as “social signal” to teams in the community that 
follow similar research goals or ethical values [123], thus creating momentum in community building. 
3.4 BENEFITS FOR TOKEN HOLDERS 
Tokens may be deemed digital assets which may be swapped into alternative crypto-assets at secondary 
markets, converted into fiat currencies at various exchanges, be staked, simply “hodled” [44], or spent on 
settling utility fees for transactions on the blockchain. Tokens can also provide credibility for increasing the 




equivalents to traditional governance, scientific advisory boards or arbitration panels, or a DAO where, in its 
purest implementation, most decisions need clearance by (token-weight) vote of their stakeholders. 
Also the project itself might establish a rule set which tags an internal value to the tokens [208]. In addition to 
project ownership associated with participation in value creation (dividends) and project direction 
(management), blockchain-recorded personalized tokens can account for credible certification of soft skills, 
professional and academic qualifications [209], or hard facts like authorship, impact factors, research income 
and invention disclosures, e.g., to enhance CVs or for boosting job applications at different (participating) 
organisations. Here we can envision a conceptual and technological alignment with the domain of Self-
Sovereign Identity (SSI), such as the Verifiable Credentials Data Model, developed by the W3C [210]. Other 
tokens may be accrued by team members to avail of popular incentives, e.g., career promotion, bonus 
payments, additional holidays, travel upgrades, a company car, or be pooled for sponsoring team events.  
3.5 TOKEN-STAKED PREDICTION MARKETS 
Further to the previously quoted benefits, tokens can be used as “skin in the game” to foster community 
approaches for optimized assessment, planning and forecasting project uncertainties. In fact, broad 
involvement of expertise, skill and labour in generating knowledge has always resided at the very core of 
science and RTD, and mostly administrative hurdles have confined outreach on a broader scale. At least in 
principle, these barriers, which are somewhat hampering progress and consensus on extending the 
“knowledge”, may be lifted by adopting previously described liquid democracy strategies, and staking 
mechanisms, such as PoW or PoS, that are already underpinning blockchain. 
More specifically, prediction markets can be created where all interested parties, whether workers and 
investors as well as project-internal and external experts and evaluators, can stake their tokens to support their 
credibility for contributing, assessing, and future-proofing the project, thus creating synergistical win-win 
scenarios. Curation markets [99, 211] and TBCs [97] can be set up very swiftly on blockchain to receive 
valuable feedback, publicity and engagement on early-stage project ideas, their implementation plans and first 
results. In their endgame, and to differentiate them from ICOs that may be subject to rather strict financial 
legislation, contributors from the scientific community might be rewarded by formalized reputation tokens 
which acknowledge their capability to identify the potential while the project still dwells at its infant stage; the 
tokens earned this way can be used in other projects, e.g., to increase voting power on governance and 
arbitration boards. TBC protocols might also incorporate mechanisms for (partially) funding the projects, e.g., 
through arbitrage from trading tokens or providing liquidity to secondary markets. 
While there is still some pioneering work to be carried out for conclusively demonstrating that non-fiscal 
instruments enhance a business proposal towards investors, e.g., in form of an ICO or DAO, tokens awarded 
for intellectual achievements would certainly epitomize a not (directly) monetizable value that most 
researchers would still be eager to accumulate and utilize for their interests. 
3.6 PUBLICATION, PEER REVIEW & FUNDING SYSTEM 
In the first half of the 20th century, scientific journals started filtering submissions through critical assessment 
by independent colleagues. This peer review system [212] has essentially survived into modern days, in some 
fields supplemented by electronic preprint servers [213, 214] which release manuscripts prior to full 
submission, usually to enquire constructive upfront feedback from colleagues in the community, and to 
establish precedence of the work. While the system of scientific publishing has proven to function for the 
most part, it is, at least at times, still prone to poor quality and even nepotism, e.g., due to paucity of highly 
qualified referees caused by poor incentivization, the once-off nature and anonymity of reviewer involvement, 
sub-standard publishing houses and the practical absence of rewards and penalties for poor judgement on 
project impact. 
Blockchain technologies could also provide fair models for access to scientific data. In its current state, large 
portions of the scientific record are siloed in private enterprise or only available through pricy subscription 
models, including important metrics such as citation numbers. 
It is evident that the collateral-backed reputation systems like token economies and prediction markets 
coordinated by blockchain’s decentralised and transparent peer-to-peer network would be well-suited to boost 




and, importantly, their broad-scale adoption in the community. These shortcomings affect publications as well 
as typical funding mechanisms implemented by public agencies, where blockchain-based staking of reputation 
and crypto assets could help formulate calls and support scientific progress, monitor administration and 
exploitation.  
However, note that the publishing based on blockchain technology and within its community, with exceptions 
[124, 172-174, 176, 199, 202, 215-224], is so far dominated by unaudited white papers, non-systematically 
archived web pages, unfiltered news releases and hardly traceable social media contributions which are 
commented on rather secluded internet forums. This rather Bohemian publishing culture, and a stark clash of 
jargon, contrasts the traditional path for publishing in the scientific community, which involves vigorous peer-
review for affording credibility and quality, and reputed publishers for assuring documentation that is stable 
on the long term. 
3.7 DECENTRALIZATION 
Depending on the objective of the blockchain, different organizational setups may be chosen for the 
blockchain technology. Commercial RTD projects might want to deliberately restrict access in permissioned, 
corporate / consortium / federated blockchains, e.g., to guarantee confidentiality and retain full control of 
blockchain operations, and for lowering demands on computing infrastructure and their environmental 
footprint. On the other hand, academically minded scientific projects, e.g., for creating fundamental 
knowledge, might want to be more transparent, thus suggesting implementation on a permissionless or 
permissioned public blockchain.  
As the visionary pinnacle of transformation, science and RTD could be managed by DAOs which assume the 
function of publishing and funding including review, monitoring and impact creation. This would actually 
well comply with the century-old aspiration of research towards autonomous self-administration in a 
decentralised and objective approach of the global community, which is driven by the productive interplay of 
healthy competition and self-interest to efficiently pursue Commons [131] for the good of people, societies 
and economies. 
The management structure of DAOs would be transparently coded into blockchain-engraved algorithms 
which can be complemented by arbitration schemes, and upgraded by liquid democracy governance, as 
already executed in existing blockchain projects [93, 94]. By offering a broad range of involvement and 
commitment staked by reputation and crypto-assets, pivotal flywheel effects can be unleashed towards 
creating a critical mass of developers, early adopters and highly engaged users, which, in turn, would generate 
significant pressure on legislators to accommodate and embrace the great promise of blockchain technology 





Figure 5 Concept for grafting a blockchain-enabled project onto existing funding 
and budget schemes. In a 2-pronged approach, real-world expenses and salaries are 
reimbursed by classical funding schemes in fiat money. Aspects of governance, 
credibility, author- and inventorship leverage a token economy revolving around 
minting and staking of tokens representing crypto-assets and reputation. This token 
economy offers novel instruments for project optimization such as prediction and 
curation markets, bounties rewarded for identifying or solving particular issues, 
token bonding curves (TBCs) to incentivize thorough assessment of early-stage ideas 
by skin in the game, non-fungible tokens (NFTs), e.g., for assigning contributions to 
IP, and a liquid democracy guided management structure. The portrayed strategy 
will seminally enhance project outcomes by comprehensive community involvement 
and increase motivation for contributors. 
3.8 NUCLEATION OF PROJECTS 
While the advantages of a blockchain-based implementation have been highlighted, the challenge will be to 
graft project funding onto present, agency-based architectures, as well as to create a critical mass of 
community involvement. To start out, a “Minimum Viable Product / Project” (MVP) needs to be defined 
which may be a scaled down version featuring only select aspects of the bigger picture sketched in this work. 
suggests a possible, dual-track strategy for projects to tap into conventional public or corporate funding 
streams, thus catering for real-world expenses to be reimbursed in fiat money, while entertaining a crypto-
economically incentivized “betting” game for effectively involving the wisdom of the crowd way beyond 
legacy project structures. 
In a subsequent stage, the project itself, including the left-hand part of Figure 5, could be managed through 
blockchain technologies, e.g., by operating with fiat-pegged stablecoins for conventional financial transfers. In 
this interim model, certain fiat could be converted into cryptocurrencies for increasing the incentives fueling 
the modules right-hand side. Transparent, multi-signature fund management and IP protection incentivizes 
individuals to contribute financially and intellectually. 
In a decentralized future scenario, even the source of fiat, e.g., a public agency, foundation, or corporation, 
could be replaced by open crowdfunding, to ultimately integrate the entire organizational structure, 
encompassing publishing and exploitation, into a smart-contract encoded DAO that relies on PoS-linked skin 
in the game within a full-fledged crypto-economical ecosystem. 
4 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS & OUTLOOK 
We have surveyed key instruments of blockchain-enabled token economies that already underpin core 
elements of their ecosystem and a range of important application spaces such as store of value (mainly 
Bitcoin), decentralised finance (DeFi) and commercial supply chains as well as certification of provenance 
and ownership of unique goods like property and artwork (Non-Fungible Tokens).  
We have argued that powerful reputation systems that are enabled by blockchain’s smart-contract supported 
crypto-economy can seminally augment the traditional processes in science and RTD to advance to a globally 
inclusive “internet of knowledge”. Incentivized by such crypto assets that are awarded for a wide range of 
project contributions like idea creation, planning, assessment, funding, work, interpretation, validation, 
tutoring, leadership, team building, management, marketing and exploitation, collective intelligence, skills and 
infrastructure can be efficiently crowdsourced for projects, whether in academic research, corporate consortia 
or grassroots initiatives. 
Researchers can utilize these tokens to execute and possibly delegate their reputation-weighted voting rights in 
liquid-democracy style governance, stake them in secondary prediction markets, or to support their proposals 
for funding. In a competitive, firmly community-anchored participatory research approach, the token 
economy can thus markedly enhance the quality, credibility, reproducibility, speed, transparency, cost-
efficiency and mission critical user engagement and adoption of project outcomes, and thus also decisively 




By virtue of the outstanding importance of non-monetary reputation rewards for motivating most researchers, 
regulatory restrictions are unlikely to impede implementation of the token economy in science and RTD. It is 
foreseeable that, in combination with cloud computing, global logistics and world-wide open-access facilities 
providing co-working spaces, equipment, training and competent staff for making, characterizing and 
developing “things” [7, 8] that significantly lower entry barriers and risks for research activities, the token 
economy will breed new types of freelance researchers, citizen scientists, garage entrepreneurs and digital 
nomads whose special expertise and work force is flexibly recruited into projects based on objectivized 
performance criteria rather than affiliation. 
A trusted, blockchain backed infrastructure that includes standards for token-backed funding, oracle services 
to prove the validity of the outcomes as well as mechanisms for protecting ideas and assuring a favorable 
compensation to workers and quality to funders, e.g., by as validated by independent auditors and proper 
dispute resolution processes, can lead to a paradigm shift towards an open, community-based organization of 
science and RTD. Blockchain-enabled decentralization thus nurtures the emergence of heterogeneity, of 
small, creative, and talented individuals or teams forming “solution centers” that can build up a reputation for 
efficiently solving a certain category of tasks while operating from anywhere on the planet. As elaborated in 
this work, the future of science and RTD will emerge on top of a new form of decentralised social networks. 
Compelling advantages in trust, cost and speed will substantially push acceptance of token economies, 
administrative barriers may be overcome if continued to be driven by major academic and commercial players 
and the financial sector. Also, the present dialogue with governments, public entities like land registries, 
patent offices, funding agencies, regulatory bodies, and central banks [66-69, 225-231] needs to be intensified 
to fully embrace the blockchain. 
Yet, strong adherence to tradition presents a tall barrier for gathering critical momentum for major revision of 
the legacy schemes in science and RTD. There is a blatant gap in culture, e.g., towards procedures for 
funding, publishing, documentation, reviewing and auditing. In fact, even for composing this very paper, 
many citations point to web sites hosting transient content, and evading independent peer review; they are thus 
likely to be biased and marketing driven, and less suitable for historical archiving than articles in traditional 
journal libraries. Furthermore, the still quite volatile environment of blockchain, with issues such as workflow 
compatibility, satisfactory user experience (UX) and understanding of the crypto-economy, need to be 
convincingly resolved to efficiently promote its wide-spread adoption in science and RTD scene. 
Realistically, transition to a crypto-economical approach by science and RTD communities would have to be 
gradual, and possibly seeded by a sizeable crowd of benevolent early adopters; while the landslide 
proliferation of Bitcoin appears to prove the opposite, wide-scale adoption of the blockchain-founded 
concepts proposed here very likely needs to be fostered by well-funded campaigns to sensitize the community 
at large, for which the disruptive concepts of blockchain are still rather alien. Amara’s law [232] seems to well 
summarize the status quo and prospects for the opportunity for blockchain in science and RTD: ”We tend to 
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